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Abstract
Many graph mining and analysis services have been
deployed on the cloud, which can alleviate users
from the burden of implementing and maintaining
graph algorithms. However, putting graph analyt-
ics on the cloud can invade users’ privacy. To solve
this problem, we propose CryptGraph, which runs
graph analytics on encrypted graph to preserve the
privacy of both users’ graph data and the analytic
results. In CryptGraph, users encrypt their graphs
before uploading them to the cloud. The cloud runs
graph analysis on the encrypted graphs and obtains
results which are also in encrypted form that the
cloud cannot decipher. During the process of com-
puting, the encrypted graphs are never decrypted on
the cloud side. The encrypted results are sent back
to users and users perform the decryption to obtain
the plaintext results. In this process, users’ graphs
and the analytics results are both encrypted and the
cloud knows neither of them. Thereby, users’ pri-
vacy can be strongly protected. Meanwhile, with
the help of homomorphic encryption, the results an-
alyzed from the encrypted graphs are guaranteed to
be correct. In this paper, we present how to en-
crypt a graph using homomorphic encryption and
how to query the structure of an encrypted graph
by computing polynomials. To solve the problem
that certain operations are not executable on en-
crypted graphs, we propose hard computation out-
sourcing to seek help from users. Using two graph
algorithms as examples, we show how to apply our
methods to perform analytics on encrypted graphs.
Experiments on two datasets demonstrate the cor-
rectness and feasibility of our methods.
1 Introduction
Recently, many cloud based graph analysis services have
been launched, including IBM System G, Neo4j, GraphDB,
Dydra, Infinity Graph, GraphLab, to name a few. In cloud
based graph analytics, graph mining and analysis algorithms
are deployed on cloud servers. To use the service, users
upload their graphs to the cloud. The cloud runs graph al-
gorithms over users’ graphs and sends the results back to
Figure 1: Privacy-preserving graph analytics on encrypted
graph. A user aims to analyze his graph through the cloud
graph analytics. However, due to privacy concern, he refuses
to let the cloud see the graph. He encrypts the graph before
sending it to the cloud. The cloud runs graph analytics over
the encrypted graph and obtains the results which are also
ciphertexts that the cloud cannot decipher. The encrypted re-
sults are sent back to the user and the user does the decryption
locally to obtain the readable plaintext results.
users. Putting graph analytics on the cloud has several ben-
efits. First, users are alleviated from the burden of imple-
menting and maintaining graph algorithms, which are time-
consuming and error-prone. Second, many graph storage and
management systems have been deployed on the cloud, such
as cloud based graph database. Putting graph analytics also
on the cloud makes it easier to integrate with other graph
management services.
Despite the benefits provided by cloud graph analytics, it
suffers a severe problem: invasion of users’ privacy, which
is also suffered by many other cloud based services. To use
cloud graph analytics, users have to upload their graphs to
the cloud, which completely exposes the graphs to malicious
attackers and curious cloud owners. Besides, the results an-
alyzed from users’ input graphs are also visible to the cloud,
which is again a huge threat of users’ privacy. For some
users, their graphs are so sensitive that their privacy cannot be
compromised. Examples include atom graph of drugs (DTP,
2004), knowledge graph of confidential documents (Poh et
al., 2012), social graph containing sensitive information of
individuals (Hay et al., 2008; Liu and Terzi, 2008; Akcora et
al., 2012), to name a few. How to protect users’ privacy is a
vital factor and a big challenge for cloud graph analytics.
To solve this problem, we propose a solution called Crypt-
Graph, which runs graph analysis algorithms on encrypted
ar
X
iv
:1
40
9.
50
21
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
8 M
ar 
20
15
graphs. Users’ graphs and the analysis results are both in en-
crypted form that the cloud cannot decipher, which ensures
that users’ privacy can never be leaked to the cloud. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates our solution. Graph algorithms are deployed
on the cloud. A user wants to analyze his graph through the
cloud. Meanwhile, he refuses to let the cloud see the graph
which leaks his privacy. He encrypts the graph and sends it
to the cloud servers. The cloud receives the encrypted graph,
runs graph analytics over it and obtains the results which are
also in encrypted form that the cloud cannot decipher. During
the process of computing, the encrypted graph is never deci-
phered on the cloud side. The ciphertext results are sent back
to the user and the user does the decryption locally to obtain
the readable plaintext results. In this process, both the input
graph and the output results are encrypted, thereby, the cloud
has no chance to learn anything about the user. Users’ pri-
vacy can be strongly guaranteed. Now the problem is, with
the graph encrypted, how can we run analytics over it and
ensure the results are correct? This turns out to be possi-
ble with the help of homomorphic encryption. Homomor-
phic encryption (HE) (Gentry, 2009) is an encryption scheme
which allows certain computations over encrypted data. For
instance, given that x + y = z in the plaintext space, with
HE, the equality still holds after encryption: [[x]]
⊕
[[y]] = [[z]]
, where [[x]], [[y]], [[z]] are the ciphertexts encrypting x, y, z and⊕
denotes homomorphic addition. Under homomorphic en-
cryption, though data are encrypted, computations can still be
performed and are guaranteed to be correct. Practical homo-
morphic encryption schemes have certain restrictions over the
computations they can perform. They can compute addition,
subtraction, multiplication and negation, but do not support
division and comparison. Many graph algorithms involve di-
vision and comparison, which makes it very challenging to
perform analytics over encrypted graph.
In this paper, we investigate how to encrypt a graph and
how to perform computations over the encrypted graph. Our
major contributions are:
• Our work is the first one proposing to encrypt a graph
with homomorphic encryption, which can protect all the
structure information of a graph without losing the abil-
ity to perform graph analytics over it.
• We develop algorithmic and system solutions to adress
the problem that division and comparison are not com-
putable on encrypted graph. One is querying graph
structure by computing polynomials, which avoids com-
parison. The other is hard computation outsourcing,
which solicits users to perform a small fraction of op-
erations which are hard for the cloud.
• On two important graph algorithms and two datasets, we
demonstrate that analytics on encrypted graph are cor-
rect and feasible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces related works and Section 3 introduces homomor-
phic encryption. Section 4 presents our method to run ana-
lytics on encrypted graphs and Section 5 studies two applica-
tions. Section 6 presents experimental results and Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Related Works
Preserving privacy of graph data has been extensively stud-
ied in many works. In general, they can be categorized
into two paradigms: encryption based approaches and non-
encryption based approaches. Encryption based approaches
(Chase and Kamara, 2010; Cao et al., 2011; Poh et al., 2012;
Yi et al., 2014) design encryption schemes to enable search-
ing and querying over encrypted graphs. Cao et al. (2011)
studied how to perform containment query, namely whether
a graph is a subgraph of another graph. Chase and Kamara
(2010) developed a structural encryption scheme which sup-
ports neighbor queries and adjacency queries on encrypted
graphs. Poh et al. (2012) investigated how to perform search-
ing over encrypted conceptual graphs. Yi et al. (2014) stud-
ied how to perform reachability queries: whether a vertex is
reachable from another vertex. These encryption schemes are
mainly designed to support graph searching and querying and
they are unable to perform computation-oriented graph ana-
lytics such as computing clustering coefficient and PageRank.
Several works (Duan et al., 2005; Sakuma and Kobayashi,
2009) utilized partially homomorphic encrytion to perform
link analysis algorithms. Their problem settings are quite dif-
ferent from ours. In their settings, vertices of a graph belong
to multiple parties and each party desires to protect its privacy
against all others. In our setting, the graph is owned by one
user who aims to protect the privacy of the graph against the
cloud.
Non-encryption based approaches preserve graph privacy
by anonymizing vertices and edges in the graph (Hay et al.,
2008; Liu and Terzi, 2008; Zheleva and Getoor, 2008; Zhou
and Pei, 2008) or using differentially private graph models
(Sala et al., 2011; Task and Clifton, 2012). Liu and Terzi
(2008) proposed a k-degree vertex anonymization method un-
der which for each vertex v there exist at least k − 1 other
vertices in the graph with the same degree as v. Hay et al.
(2008) anonymizes a graph by partitioning the vertices and
then describing the graph at the level of partitions. Sala et
al. (2011) developed a differentially private graph model for
privacy protection, which generates a synthetic graph main-
taining structural similarity to the original graph while in-
troducing difference to provide the designed privacy guaran-
tee. While these methods can protect the privacy of certain
elements in the graph, such as vertices, they still expose a
lot of information, such as structures, to the attackers. On
the other hand, these methods change the original structure
of the graph, thereby the analytics results obtained on the
anonymized/synthesized graph might be quite different from
those on the original graph.
3 Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we briefly introduce homomorphic encryption
(Gentry, 2009) which allows certain computations over en-
crypted data. Figure 2 illustrates how homomorphic encryp-
tion works. The user wants to compute the sum of 3 and 5
using the cloud, but he is reluctant to let the cloud know these
two numbers. He encrypts 3 and 5 into ciphertexts, sends
them to the cloud and tells the cloud that he wants to add
them. The cloud performs a ⊕ operation which is analogous
3 + 5 = 8
3 5
8 3 5 8=
Homomorphic
Encryption
Homomorphic
Decryption
Homomorphic 
Addition
Figure 2: An illustration of homomorphic encryption. The
user wants to compute the sum of 3 and 5 without allowing
the cloud to see these two numbers. He does the homomor-
phic encryption of 3 and 5, and sends the ciphertexts to the
cloud. The cloud does a homomorphic addition of the two ci-
phertexts and gets a result which is also encrypted. The result
is sent back to the user. The user does homomorphic decryp-
tion of the result and gets 8, which is exactly the sum of 3 and
5.
to the addition on integers and obtains a result, which is also
encrypted. The cloud sends the encrypted result back to the
user. The user does homomorphic decryption locally and ob-
tains the plaintext result 8, which is exactly the sum of 3 and
5. With homomorphic encryption, certain computations can
successfully be performed although the data are in encrypted
form. And the computation is guaranteed to be correct.
In this paper, we use the ring based homomorphic en-
cryption schemes (Brakerski, 2012; Brakerski et al., 2012;
Wu and Haven, 2012; Bos et al., 2013; Lyubashevsky et
al., 2013), which are arguably the most popular and practi-
cal ones. These schemes support addition, subtraction and
multiplication on encrypted data, but cannot perform division
and comparison. Besides, these schemes require the plain-
text messages to be integers. If the message is a real number,
we convert it into an integer by multiplying a large integer
number s. s is given to the cloud and is needed during homo-
morphic computation. After computation, the cloud sends the
encrypted result together with a new scaling number sˆ (which
is related with s) back to the user. User does homomorphic
decryption and divides the decrypted result (which is an inte-
ger) with sˆ to obtain the real number result.
4 Graph Analytics on Encrypted Graph
In this section, we present how to encrypt a graph and how to
perform analytics on the encrypted graph.
4.1 Graph Representation and Encryption
To enable management and computation of a graph on the
cloud, it is necessary to let the cloud servers know certain in-
formation about the graph. Meanwhile, we protect the key
information and prohibit the cloud servers from accessing
it. In general, we expose the following information to the
cloud: number of vertices in the graph, types of graph (undi-
rected, directed, unweighted, weighted, bipartite). For bipar-
tite graph, we also expose the number of vertices in each par-
tite. The key information we want to keep private is: the
meaning of vertices, degree of vertices, number of edges,
whether an edge exists between two vertices, directions of
edges, weights on edges.
To protect the key information, we need to represent and
encrypt the graph properly. We represent a graph with an
adjacency matrix. Given a graph G = (V,E) with vertices V
and edges E, we use an adjacency matrix I of size |V | × |V |
to represent its edges. Iij denotes the connectivity between
vertex i ∈ V and vertex j ∈ V . For simplicity, we assume
there is at most one edge between each pair of vertices. For
an undirected graph, Iij = 1 if vertex i and j are connected;
Iij = 0, otherwise. For a directed graph, Iij = 1 if the edge
Eij is an inbound edge of vertex i; Iij = 0 if there is no edge
between vertex i and j; Iij = −1 if Eij is an outbound edge
of vertex i. In both the directed graphs and undirected graphs,
Iii is set to 0. For a bipartite graph G = (U, V,E), where
U and V are the two disjoint vertex sets and E denotes the
edges, its adjacency matrix I is of size |U |×|V |. The rows of
I corresponds to vertices in U and columns of I corresponds
to vertices in V . Iij = 1 if vertex i ∈ U and j ∈ V are
connected; Iij = 0, otherwise. For a weighted graph, we use
an additional matrix W to represent weights on the edges,
where Wij denotes the weight on the edge Eij . Note that for
a plaintext weighted graph, the weight matrix by itself can
represent the graph structure where Wij = 0 denotes there
is no edge between vertex i and j and the adjacency matrix
is not needed. However, for an encrypted graph, the weight
matrix cannot be used to depict graph structure and the reason
will be explained in Section 4.2.
To encrypt a graph, we encrypt each element of the ad-
jacency matrix I and weight matrix W independently using
homomorphic encryption (HE). Let I˜ denote the encrypted
adjacency matrix and W˜ denote the encrypted weight matrix.
HE is a random encryption scheme that adds random noise to
plaintexts. Under random encryption, the same plaintext will
be turned into different ciphertexts each time it is encrypted.
Though the elements in plaintext I can only take values in
{0, 1,−1}, the elements in ciphertext I˜ are different from
each other (with high probability) due to the randomness of
homomorphic encryption and the security guarantee that at-
tackers cannot decipher these values is presented in (Braker-
ski, 2012; Brakerski et al., 2012; Wu and Haven, 2012; Bos et
al., 2013; Lyubashevsky et al., 2013). In CryptGraph, all the
cloud can see are I˜ and W˜ , where the elements are cipher-
texts which make no sense to the cloud. The cloud has no
way to know whether an edge exists between two vertices or
the direction and weight of an edge, thereby it knows nothing
about the structure of the graph.
4.2 Query Graph Structure by Computing
Polynomials
Querying the structure of a graph is a major operation in
graph algorithms, such as selecting the neighboring vertices
of a given vertex, selecting the inbound or outbound edges of
a vertex, judging whether a group of vertices form a strong
clique or not, etc. On unencrypted graphs, this can be eas-
ily done. To represent neighborhood relationships between
two vertices or between an edge and a vertex, we can use an
adjacency list. To judge whether a group of vertices are inter-
connected, we can use if-else statement to inspect the connec-
tivities among these vertices. However, on encrypted graphs,
this becomes very hard. First, an adjacency list cannot be
used since it leaks the structure information of a graph. Sec-
ond, if-else judgment cannot be performed since comparison
is not executable over encrypted data.
To solve this problem, we propose to rewrite all queries
into polynomial computations. Polynomials involve addition
and multiplication, which are computable by the homomor-
phic encryption scheme. We assume all queries are boolean,
where the input is a statement and the output is either true
(denoted with 1) or false (denoted with 0). According to how
many vertices are involved, we categorize queries into two
kinds: atom query which is about the relationship between
two vertices and conjunction query which is about the rela-
tionship between multiple vertices. Atom queries are of three
kinds: 1, are vertex i and vertex j connected with an undi-
rected edge? 2, is vertex j the inbound neighbor of vertex
i? (equivalently, is there a directed edge from j to i?) 3, is
vertex j the outbound neighbor of vertex i? (equivalently, is
there a directed edge from i to j). Conjunction queries can
be constructed by conjoining atom queries. For instance, “are
vertex i,j,k in a triangle?” can be equivalently written as “are
i and j connected? AND are j and k connected? AND are i
and j connected?”. The answer of a conjunction query is true
if and only if the answers of all atom queries are true. On
encrypted graphs, we construct polynomials p : S˜ → {1˜, 0˜}
to answer these queries, where S˜ is a subset of elements in
the adjacency matrix I˜ . Note that we use the notation 1˜, 0˜ to
emphasize that the outputs of polynomials are also encrypted
and the cloud has no way to decipher them. In the rest of
the paper, if not explicitly stated, a˜ denotes the encrypted
ciphertext of a. For atom queries involving vertex i and j,
S˜ = {I˜ij}. For conjunction queries involving a set of ver-
tices A, S˜ = {I˜ij |i ∈ A ∧ j ∈ A ∧ i 6= j}. For the first atom
query “are vertex i and vertex j connected with an undirected
edge?”, it can be directly answered from the adjacency matrix
I˜ of an undirected graph. I˜ij = 1˜ means there is an edge be-
tween i and j; I˜ij = 0˜, otherwise. So the polynomial would
simply be p1(x) = x. The other two queries can be answered
by evaluating polynomials over the adjacency matrix I˜ of di-
rected graphs. To answer “is vertex j the inbound neighbor
of vertex i?”, we evaluate p2(x) = 12x
2+ 12x over I˜ij . Recall
that I˜ij = 1˜ denotes there is a directed edge from j to i and
I˜ij = 0˜ otherwise. p2(x) maps 1˜ to 1˜ and maps 0˜ and −˜1 to 0˜.
Thereby, p2(x) is capable to pick out the inbound edges. Sim-
ilarly, to answer “is vertex j the outbound neighbor of vertex
i?”, we evaluate p3(x) = 12x
2− 12x over I˜ij . This polynomial
is compatible with the representation of outbound edges. We
call these polynomials answering atom queries as atom poly-
nomials. Note that p2(x) and p3(x) involve real numbers 12
and − 12 , which are not directly computable under homomor-
phic encryption. We use the method discussed in Section 3
to deal with these real numbers. In the rest of the paper, we
tackle all real numbers in this way without explicitly reiter-
ating. In Section 4.1, we state that the weight matrix cannot
be used to represent the structure of a weighted graph. This
is because we cannot find atom polynomials to map the real-
valued weights to {1, 0}.
Knowing how to answer atom queries, we can answer con-
junction queries by multiplying atom polynomials. A con-
junction query consisting K atom queries Q(c) = Q(a)1 ∧
Q
(a)
2 ∧ · · · ∧Q(a)K can be answered with a polynomial p(c) =
p
(a)
1 ·p(a)2 · · · ·p(a)K , which is the product of K atom polynomi-
als. p(c) is called conjunction polynomial. p(c) equals to 1˜ if
and only if all atom polynomials equal to 1˜, this is consistent
with the fact that the answer of a conjunction query is true if
and only if the answers of all atom queries are true.
Graph algorithms usually involve operations over
a set where elements satisfy certain conditions.
For example, to count the triangles containing ver-
tex i, we need to calculate the cardinality of a set
{(i, j, k)|vertexe i, j, k form a triangle}. In PageRank,
to update the PageRank value for a vertex i, we need to sum
up all the weighted PageRank values of the inbound neighbor
set {j|j is the inbound neighbor of i}. The cloud can answer
the queries “do vertices i,j,k form a triangle?” and “is j
the inbound neighbor of i?” by calculating polynomials.
However, the cloud does not know what the answers are since
they are also encrypted. Thereby, the cloud has no way to
create a set whose elements meet certain conditions. To solve
this problem, we propose to perform masked computations
over elements in the universal set. Operation on each element
is masked with the authenticity that whether the element
satisfies a certain condition. If the authenticity is 1˜, the
element contributes to the final result. If the authenticity
is 0˜, the element has no influence of the final result. For
example, in PageRank, to update the PageRank value of a
vertex i, one needs to sum up the weighted PageRank values
wj of its inbound neighbors N (i). Since the cloud cannot
construct N (i), we can perform the masked summation∑
j∈V w˜j · p2(I˜ij) over all vertices V , where p2(x) is
the atomic polynomial selecting inbound neighbors. If j
is an inbound neighbor of i, p2(I˜ij) equals to 1˜ and the
contribution w˜j of vertex j will be counted into the final sum.
If j is not an inbound neighbor of i, p2(I˜ij) = 0˜ and w˜j will
not be contributed to the final sum.
4.3 Hard Computation Outsourcing
Recall that homomorphic encryption cannot support divi-
sion and comparison, which we refer to as hard computa-
tions. These two types of computations exist extensively
in graph algorithm. For example, comparison is needed
in single source shortest paths (SSSP) and division is re-
quired in PageRank. While these two operations are hard for
homomorphic encryption schemes, they are easy for users.
Thereby, we propose to outsource the hard computations back
to the users who own the graphs. Whenever the cloud encoun-
ters a hard computation O over some data D˜, it sends D˜ back
to the graph owner and solicits the owner to perform O on D˜.
Note that, D˜ are intermediate results which are in encrypted
form. On users’ side, there is a client process in charge of
processing the hard computations for the cloud. The client
first decrypts D˜ into plaintext data D, then performs O over
D and obtains a result R. R is then encrypted into R˜ which
is sent back to the cloud. The cloud receives R˜ and resumes
6 ÷ 3 = 2
6 3
2
6 3 =
Decryption
Encryption
÷ ?
Figure 3: An illustration of hard computation outsourcing.
The cloud is not able to compute the division between en-
crypted 6 and 3. It sends the two ciphertexts back to the user
and asks the user to do a division. The user decrypts the ci-
phertexts and gets the plaintext numbers 6 and 3. User divides
6 by 3 and gets 2, which is very easy to compute. The result
2 is encrypted and sent back to the cloud. The cloud gets the
encrypted 2 and resumes the computation.
the computation. Figure 3 illustrates the idea of hard compu-
tation outsourcing. The cloud wants to compute the division
between two ciphertexts. Unfortunately, division is not com-
putable over encrypted data. The cloud sends the two cipher-
texts back to the user and asks the user to perform a division.
The user decrypts the ciphertexts and obtains two numbers 6
and 3. The user divides 6 by 3 and obtains 2, which is very
easy to compute. The result 2 is encrypted and sent back to
the cloud. The cloud receives the encrypted 2 and resumes
the computation.
The drawback of hard computation outsourcing is that
users are involved in the computation. This in some sense
violates the motivation of cloud graph analytics, which is to
alleviate users’ burden of implementing and maintaining their
own graph algorithms. To mitigate this drawback, we propose
two principles. First, hard computations should be a small
proportion of the whole computations in a graph algorithm.
In other words, most of the computations should happen on
the cloud side and users only need to perform a few computa-
tions that the cloud cannot do. Second, the computations that
users help to perform should not be algorithm-specific. Users
only need to provide a set of basic computations which are
common to all graph algorithms. This ensures that the com-
putations on users’ side are stable no matter how significantly
the graph algorithms change on the cloud side.
5 Applications
In this section, we show how to perform graph analytics on
encrypted graphs with the above mentioned two techniques.
Specifically, we study two graph algorithms: computing clus-
tering coefficient and PageRank.
5.1 Clustering Coefficient
Clustering coefficient (Suri and Vassilvitskii, 2011) cc(i) of a
vertex i in an undirected graph measures how tightly-knit the
community is around the vertex. It is defined as
cc(i) =
|(j, k) ∈ E|j ∈ N (i) ∧ k ∈ N (i)|
0.5 · di · (di − 1) (1)
whereN (i) is the neighbor set of vertex i and di is the degree
of vertex i. The numerator is basically the count of triangles
containing vertex i. To compute the clustering coefficients
of vertices on an encrypted graph, the cloud first computes
the degree d˜i of each vertex, which is the sum of all ele-
ments of the ith row in I˜ . Then it computes the denominator
0˜.5·d˜i ·(d˜i−1˜). Since division is not supported, the cloud can
use hard computation outsourcing to compute the reciprocal
of 0˜.5 · d˜i · (d˜i − 1˜). In this case, users only need to compute
N divisions, where N is the number of vertices. This amount
of computation is light-weight and meets the first principle of
hard computation outsourcing. Using the polynomial based
structure querying method, the triangle count on the numera-
tor can be equivalently written into
|(j, k) ∈ E|j ∈ N (i) ∧ k ∈ N (i)|
=
|V |∑
j=1
j 6=i
|V |∑
k=j+1
k 6=i
I˜ij · I˜ik · I˜jk (2)
where the equality holds subject to encryption and decryp-
tion. The conjunction query (j, k) ∈ E ∧ j ∈ N (i) ∧ k ∈
N (i) is evaluated with a conjunction polynomial p(x) =
x · x · x. This equation basically examines all possible (j, k)
pairs to see whether they form a triangle with i. (i, j, k) forms
a triangle if and only if I˜ij = 1˜, I˜ik = 1˜ and I˜jk = 1˜, equiv-
alently, I˜ij · I˜ik · I˜jk = 1˜.
5.2 PageRank
PageRank (Page et al., 1999) is an algorithm to compute the
importance of vertices in a directed and unweighted graph.
The underlying assumption is that more important vertices
are likely to receive more links (inbound edges) from other
vertices. The PageRank value PR(i) of vertex i can be com-
puted as
PR(i) =
1− d
N
+ d
∑
j∈NI(i)
1
DO(j)
PR(j) (3)
where NI(i) are the inbound neighbors of i and DO(j) is
the outdegree of j. d is a parameter which we set to 0.85 and
N is the total number of vertices. This equation is iteratively
computed over each vertex until the PageRank value of each
vertex converges.
To run PageRank over an encrypted graph, the cloud
needs to compute Eq.(3) under the homomorphic encryption
scheme. In this equation, (1 − d)/N and 1/DO(j) involve
divisions, which are not supported by the encryption scheme.
Since the cloud knows the fixed parameter d and the num-
ber of vertices N , it can compute (1 − d)/N on plaintext
data. To compute 1/D˜O(j), the cloud uses hard computa-
tion outsourcing. The cloud first computes D˜O(j) for each
vertex, then sends D˜O(j) to the graph owner and solicits
a reciprocal operation. Users decrypt D˜O(j) into plaintext
value DO(j), compute the reciprocal 1/DO(pj), encrypt
the reciprocal and send the ciphertext back to the cloud. In
the whole process, users only need to compute the recip-
rocal of N numbers once, which is light-weight. Comput-
ing
∑
j∈NI(i)
1
DO(j)PR(j) requires to pick out the inbound
neighbors of i. To achieve this, the cloud evaluates the atom
Table 1: Clustering coefficients (CC) of Dolphin Social Net-
work
Graph Avg CC Max CC Min CC MSE
Unencrypted 0.2590 0.6667 0 0
Encrypted 0.2589 0.6666 0 1.7e-9
Table 2: PageRank (PR) values of Political Blogs
Graph Avg PR Max PR Min PR MSE
unencrypted 0.00044 0.0878 0.0001 0
encrypted 0.00043 0.0875 0.0001 1.0e-7
polynomial p(x) = 12x
2 + 12x on each element I˜ij of the
ith row of the adjacency matrix I˜ . If p(I˜ij) = 1˜, j is an in-
bound neighbor of i. Since the cloud cannot know the output
of p(I˜ij), it performs the masked summation over all vertices∑
j∈NI(i)
1
DO(j)
PR(j) =
N∑
j=1
p(I˜ij)
1
D˜O(j)
P˜R(j) (4)
In this equation, only inbound neighbors where p(I˜ij) = 1˜
contributes to the final sum.
6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the correctness and speed of graph
analytics on two encrypted graphs.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We use two datasets in the experiments. The first one is the
Dolphin Social Network (Lusseau et al., 2003) which is an
undirected social network of frequent associations between
62 dolphins. The graph has 62 nodes and 159 edges. The
second dataset is the Political Blogs (Adamic and Glance,
2005) which is a directed network of hyperlinks between we-
blogs on US politics. This graph has 1490 nodes and 16718
edges. Some edges are removed to ensure there is at most one
edge between each pair of nodes. We used the homomorphic
encryption (HE) scheme implemented1 by (Wu and Haven,
2012) and follow their parameter setting of the encryption
scheme.
6.2 Result
On each of the datasets, we perform graph analytics on the
plaintext graph and the encrypted graph and compare their
difference. The graph analytics we performed are: 1, com-
pute the clustering coefficient of each vertex in the Dol-
phin Social Network; 2, compute the PageRank value of
each vertex in the Political Blogs graph. Table 1 shows the
average, max and min clustering coefficients on the plain-
text and encrypted Dolphin Social Network. We also show
the mean square error (MSE) 1N
N∑
n=1
||CC(p)n − CC(e)n ||2 be-
tween the clustering coefficients {CC(p)n }Nn=1 computed on
1https://github.com/dwu4/fhe-si
Table 3: Time of triangle counting for each vertex in Dolphin
Social Network
Graph Time (s)
unencrypted 1e-8
encrypted 18.77
Table 4: Time of updating PageRank value for each vertex in
Political Blogs
Graph Time (s)
unencrypted 2e-7
encrypted 56.43
the plaintext graph and {CC(e)n }Nn=1 obtained from the en-
crypted graph, where N is the number of vertices. From
Table 1, we can see that the results obtained from the en-
crypted graph are very close to those obtained from the plain-
text graph. Through the graph is encrypted, clustering coeffi-
cients can still be computed and are guaranteed to be correct.
Encrypting the graph does not incur significant performance
loss. The difference between the clustering coefficients on
the plaintext graph and the encrypted graph mainly comes
from the conversion of real numbers to integers when do-
ing the computations on encrypted data. Table 2 shows the
average, max and min PageRank values on the unencrypted
and encrypted Political Blogs graph. We also compute the
MSE 1N
N∑
n=1
||PR(p)n − PR(e)n ||2 between {PR(p)n }Nn=1 and
{PR(e)n }Nn=1 which are the PageRank values computed from
the plaintext graph and the encrypted graph respectively and
N is the number of vertices. From Table 2, we can see that
the PageRank values obtained from the encrypted graph are
very close to those obtained from the plaintext graph. Again,
encrypting the graph does not degrade the performance of
PageRank. Table 1 and Table 2 indicate that graph analyt-
ics on encrypted graphs are guaranteed to be correct.
To check the speed of graph analytics on the encrypted
graph, we measure the time of the key operations in each
analytic task. In computing clustering coefficients, the key
operation is triangle counting. Table 3 shows the average
time (in seconds) of triangle counting for each vertex in the
Dolphin Social Network. In PageRank, updating PageRank
value for each vertex using Eq.(3) and Eq.(4) is the key oper-
ation. Table 4 shows the average time (in seconds) of updat-
ing PageRank value for each vertex in Political Blogs. Time
spent on other operations such as encryption, decryption,
outsourcing (communication between user clients and cloud
servers) is neglectable compared with homomorphic compu-
tatons, thereby, we omit it here. As can be seen from Table 3
and 4, not surprisingly, the computations on encrypted graph
are much slower than those on the plaintext graph. However,
considering that most graph analytics do not need to be done
in realtime, the time spent on encrypted graph is acceptable.
Moreover, computations on encrypted graphs can be easily
parallelized on the multi-core and distributed computing fa-
cilities on cloud platforms, which can improve the speed in
great manner and make encrypted graph analytics more fea-
sible.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how to perform graph analytics on en-
crypted graphs, with the aim to protect users’ privacy. We in-
vestigate how to encrypt a graph such that its structural infor-
mation is protected from leakage. Given a encrypted graph,
we propose to query its structure by computing polynomials.
Considering that division and comparison are not computable
by homomorphic encryption, we propose hard computation
outsourcing, which solicits graph owners to help compute a
small fraction of operations that the cloud cannot do. Using
two graph algorithms as examples, we show how to leverage
polynomial based structure querying method and hard com-
putation outsourcing to conduct graph analysis on encrypted
graphs. Experiments on two real datasets demonstrate that
analytics on encrypted graph are correct and feasible.
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